work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed.
Background on PetroCaribe: Rice Compensation Scheme
On October 21, 2009, the government of Guyana signed an agreement with the government of Venezuela to barter rice for oil. 1 The Venezuelan government, in a yearly renewable contract, would (a) set the maximum quantity of paddy and white rice that it would receive and (b) set the premium price over world price at which it would value the rice shipment, and then subtract this amount from the amount due for its oil shipments to Guyana. The rice-oil compensation has generated benefits for both sides.
For Guyana, the cost of its oil import bill was contained and the size of its overall public debt has been effectively reduced both by the generous long-term financing terms (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) years, 1 percent interest, 1-2-year grace period) under the standard PetroCaribe Agreement 2 plus the additional price subsidy implicit in the premium paid over world price. In addition,
Guyana was able to conserve a significant amount of foreign exchange and accumulate more gross international reserves.
For Venezuela, the benefits of the scheme were both economic and noneconomic. First, given Venezuela's growing foreign exchange scarcity and shortages of staple food items, the reliable sourcing of a known quantity of rice on barter terms alleviated a foreign exchange constraint, improved food security, and permitted the continuance of subsidized feeding programs that served to contain restiveness. However, in net economic terms, Venezuela probably transferred more benefits to Guyana that it received, by exchanging a high value commodity (oil) for a low value commodity (rice) and then extending generous loan terms on the cash portion of the exchange. Thus, the main benefit to Venezuela seems to have been noneconomic. Venezuela gained broad influence, burnished its image as a donor and obtained the support of its PetroCaribe partners for its various diplomatic positions in international fora until of late.
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This article aims to (a) trace the effect of the Guyanese rice sector agreement in terms of its output, employment, export earnings; (b) assess Guyana's competitiveness in rice production 1 See the Appendix for a detailed explanation of the mechanics of the program. 2 The payment system allows for purchase of oil at market value for 5 to 50 percent upfront, with a grace period of 1-2 years; the remainder can be paid through a 17-25-year financing agreement with 1 percent interest, if oil prices are greater than US$40 per barrel. 3 In March 2014, the Organization of American States voted 22-11 with one abstention against allowing Marina Corina Machado, a Venezuelan legislator, from speaking at a closed session to present the view of the opposition to the Maduro regime as the body deliberated how to mediate between the standing government and the opposition. The countries that voted against the measure included Nicaragua (who proposed the motion), Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, and all of the Caribbean countries except Barbados. Besides Venezuela, the members of PetroCaribe are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.
in relation to other rice-exporting countries; and (c) review the strategies for Guyana to mitigate the loss of the Venezuelan preferential market.
Rice Production and Marketing Structures
Rice has been cultivated on a commercial scale in Guyana for more than a century, with the first recorded exports being in 1903. In addition, it is a staple in the Guyanese diet and the principal carbohydrate consumed. Paddy rice cultivation occurs primarily in the low-lying Atlantic coastal littoral in Administrative Regions 2, 4, 5, and 6 but upland or dryland rice has been introduced in Region 9, the Rupununi Savannahs close to Brazil border. There are two crops each year, the first between February and May and the second one between September and December. All the rice along the coast is grown in submerged irrigated fields, whereas the rice planted in the Rupununi Savannahs are mostly rainfed but supplemented with irrigated water where feasible and the scale of production is much smaller than on the coast.
Guyana is essentially self-sufficient in rice, producing far more than the 145,000-150,000 metric tons needed to satisfy domestic demand (U.S Department of Agriculture, 2013).
Only small amounts of internationally branded rice and high-priced specialty aromatic basmati rice are imported. Since 2012, basmati varieties have begun to be grown in the country, but the main constraint is lack of a low-cost means to switch capacity from milling common varieties to basmati and the finances needed for separate storage facilities. In 2013, twenty farmers cultivated 240 acres of basmati and one miller is processing their output. Cost of production is higher than for common varieties, but yields obtained are higher (41 percent) and prices fetched are higher.
Approximately 16,000 farming households (57,600 indirectly) 4 and approximately 4,000 casual laborers rely on the cultivation of rice for their livelihoods (see Table 1 ). Given that the estimated active labor force in 2009 was 313,100, direct rice employment is approximately 6 percent (CIA Work Factbook, 2014).
As shown in Table 1 , the majority of rice farmers are located in Region 2 (Pomeroon).
Among these farmers, the majority cultivate less than 30 acres, making them small producers.
The small scale of operations poses obstacles to modernization and realizing gains in efficiency.
Small farmers tend to use lower levels of technology and face binding financing constraints that limit how rapidly they can scale up operations, use more machinery, and improve efficiency. The fact that there is a large number of small farmers also complicates the delivery of extension services and the coordination of marketing efforts. In addition to producers and casual day laborers, there are 72 licensed mills with a combined milling capacity of 313.8 metric tons per hour (see Table 2 ) and an unknown number of employees. As shown in Table 2 , Regions 2 and 3 and Regions 4 and 5 combined have approximately the same number of mills; however, Regions 4 and 5, including the greater Georgetown area and main port, have the largest installed milling capacity. Even though Region 2 has the largest number of rice producers, the majority of them are small scale. The milling capacity is installed closest to the larger producers in Region 5, which in addition to producing the largest output, is also close to the main port (see Figure 1) . 
Rice Sector Performance under the Rice Compensation Scheme
Historically, the performance of the rice industry has been volatile, with the industry being affected both by global demand conditions and by many domestic factors affecting supply such as weather, irrigation water management issues, and financial constraints (see Figure 2 ).
However, in the past 5 years, the industry has recorded significant growth and improvements, Table 3 ). In 2014, it dropped to 30 percent. In 2015, the share is expected to be 26 percent. Since 2009, growth in rice exports to Venezuela has been at the expense of Guyana's other key rice export destinations, in particular The Netherlands, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti, where Guyana exports declined between the period 2009 to 2012. However, its exports to these markets rebounded somewhat in 2013, as production levels exceeded the demand from the Venezuelan and other markets. 
Distribution of Benefits under the Rice Trade Agreement
The premium prices offered by Venezuela for rice and paddy has allowed for the distribution of 
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To ensure that the benefits of the higher prices obtained from the Venezuelan market were evenly distributed, the Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB) allocated quotas to all rice millers on the basis of their annual production values. Higher producing millers got to supply greater quantities of their products to the Venezuelan market proportionate to their share of national production. This has served as an incentive for millers to increase their paddy purchases and milling operation in order to increase their production levels over time. Farmers have generally benefited from higher prices, in part because of the GRDB's engagement with rice millers to ensure that the benefits from the Venezuelan trade were evenly distributed. In general, farmers do not sell their products directly to Venezuela but sell their paddy to millers.
Farmers earned standard rates for their paddy sales regardless of the destination of their product. For example, in 2013, paddy prices averaged around G$3,500 per bag, equivalent to about US$269 per metric ton. This was an improvement over the prices paid in previous years that averaged about G$3,000 per bag. Actual prices in the years prior to the rice trade agreement ranged from about G$2,000 to G$4,000 per bag, with the average being close to G$2,300. Rogers & LaCruez (2014) to increase their overall production in order to win the quota rights to export to Venezuela, contributed to the effective discontinuance by many millers of the paddy grading system in the past few years. Before 2009, better grades (A grade) of paddy earned prices that were higher than poorer grades (B and C). As a result of this grading discontinuance, Guyanese rice has earned a reputation for uneven quality. Foreign customers complain of high foreign matter content, breakage, and discoloration. In March 2015, a shipment to Chile was rejected for failing to meet contract specifications for percentage broken grain and foreign matter. 
Competitiveness of the Guyanese Rice Sector
Guyana's rice industry has not had much exposure to competition with lower cost producers on the world market since exports tend to follow the preferences obtained under different trading Myanmar-have either government support programs or cost of production structures that permit them to be viable at reigning "free market prices".
Rice production reached 635,000 metric tons in 2014, of which 487,000 metric tons were exported. In 2015, the paddy harvest is anticipated to be 1,051,563, 000 metric tons (683,516 rice equivalent) and total rice exports are expected to be 520,000 metric tons (Guyana Times, breakage, and foreign matter. The ideal moisture content is 14 percent for grain and less than 12 percent for seed. Rice quality is a combination of different factors-moisture content, varietal purity, cracked grains, immature grains, and grain discoloration. High moisture results in pulverization during milling and low moisture results in shattering and cracking of the grain. During the milling process the husk is removed. In the literature a distinction is made being paddy rice and rice. However, compared with Asian rice export prices, which range between US$435 and US$455 per metric ton of 5 percent broken rice (Oryza, 2014 ), Guyana's cost of producing milled rice averaged upwards of US$515 per metric ton (Rogers & LaCruez, 2014) , considerably more expensive (by about 15 percent to 18 percent). The significant difference in Guyana's cost of production and the price at which these large producers are able to export underscores Guyana's inability to compete with global competitors outside of markets where it enjoys trade preferences or earns premium prices. This cost differential emphasizes the need for Guyana to achieve higher levels of cost efficiency.
As shown in Figure 9 , average international prices for milled rice are moderating. In recent years, the market peaked at US$572 in 2012 and has fallen steadily. Over the period 2016-19, prices are expected to hover around US$390 per metric ton. This would imply that Guyanese mills will have to shave costs significantly or focus on differentiated and valuedadded products.
Box 1. Typical Rice Milling Cost Structure
If the purchase cost of paddy were excluded, the main cost components for rice millers are… 
Cost of Production
On the basis of data collected from a rice miller and farmers in Region 2, the principal cost component for millers is the purchase of rice paddy, which accounts for almost 80 percent of the overall cost.
For farmers, the main costs are fertilizer (33 percent), land preparation (18 percent), and harvesting (17 percent).
Fuel cost was not extracted from the different cost components but is considered to be an important part of land preparation and harvesting costs for farmers and a significant component of variable costs for millers. (Rogers & LaCruez, 2014) . 
Yield
The national average rice yield per acre has increased steadily since 2010, which is attributable to the introduction of new high yield varieties such as Guyana Rice Development Board 9, 10, 11, and 12, that collectively occupied more than 50 percent of the total acreage cultivated.
Guyana Rice Development Board 10 occupied 35 percent of the total acreage cultivated (Guyana Rice Development Board 2013). Improved yield was also the result of farmers' sensitization on the Guyana Rice Development Board's six-point system for improving farming practices regarding fertilizer mix and other issues.
The sustained increase in yields has led to the reduction in cultivation cost per metric ton in 2013 (see Figure 11 ). This was in spite of higher costs of other inputs. This holds promise that production costs per metric ton can be lowered further as the Guyana Rice Development
Board continues to work on increasing rice yields through improved farm practices, better water management, and development of new varieties, especially ones adapted to climate change ( Figure 12 ). 
Implication of Eliminated Venezuelan Rice Trade
The PetroCaribe rice-for-oil compensation arrangement between Venezuela and Guyana ended in November 2015 and will not be renewed. The compensation agreement was viewed by observers as being under threat of either modification or cancellation for some time, given the internal economic and political challenges Venezuela faces (Clegg, 2013) . As oil prices started dropping dramatically from mid 2014 to the present, Venezuela oil revenues have also plummeted, by more than 60% at last estimate. Oil revenue historically constitutes approximately 95% of the country's total export earnings and 40 % of government revenue.
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The entire PetroCaribe Program is very costly to the Venezuelan government. It is estimated that the program from its inception to the present has cost the Government of Venezuela US$50 billion in foregone oil revenue.
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The loss of the preferential rice trade with Venezuela will have profound effects on Guyana's rice sector and wider economy. The primary effect will be lower paddy prices being paid to farmers. In 2014, as the situation deteriorated in Venezuela and the signing of the annual contract was delayed, some rice millers lowered the price paid per bag of paddy by almost 15 percent to G$3,000 (US$ 14.52) (Kaieteur News, 2014) . In the second half of 2015
7 However, the discovery of a significant deposit of oil on May 22, 2015 by ExxonMobil off the coast of Guyana, Venezuela's eastern neighbor, seems to have triggered a series of events that renewed tensions over a longstanding border dispute between the countries. On May 26, the Venezuelan government issued a decree claiming the area of oil discovery (Stabroek News, 2015) . 7 As a result Guyana sought the intervention of the United Nations and Organization of American States. The dispute is now under review by UN General Secretary Ki-Moon and the Government of Guyana is requesting a referral of the matter to the International Court of Justice for final resolution. The border dispute has been onging since 1966. This renewed border tension may have contributed in some fashion to the accelerated demise of the rice-for-oil agreement between the two countries. 8 Source: http://en.mercopress.com/2015/12/11/venezuelan-subsidized-oil-sales-to-the-petrocaribe-program-on-a-tight-rope prices fell to G$1,500-G$1,800 per bag (US$7.26-8.71). What makes Guyana more vulnerable is its high degree of export dependence (75 percent) compared with the norm in international rice markets. In 2014, only 8 percent of total world rice production was traded, compared with wheat (22 percent), according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (2014). This makes the international rice trade a very volatile and thin market dominated by a few large surplus producers, predominately located in Southeast Asia. Without a larger domestic market to absorb output, and in the absence of higher storage capacity, alternative uses of rice (for example, feed, food processing, and liquor), and price support and subsidy mechanisms, Guyana is much more susceptible to world price swings than the dominant exporters-India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar.
Lower paddy prices would drastically reduce farmers' profit margins. For example, an average of G$3,000 (US$14.52) per bag of paddy would reduce the price per metric ton to US$229, and profits to the average farmer (assuming yield of 31.9 bags per acre) would drop by about 33 percent. Less efficient or less productive farmers would be affected more significantly.
For example, assuming average yields of 22 bags of paddy per acre, farmers' profits would plunge by about 78 percent to US$11 per metric ton.
This may lead to some farmers leaving the farming sector, while others who seek to improve productivity and reduce costs may continue producing rice.
Small farmers-with generally higher levels of production costs per unit than larger farmers-are likely to be most affected, and cultivation in this category may decline the most. This would undoubtedly have an impact on the welfare of farming communities and households particularly in Region 2 where 32 percent of farmers are small, and in Region 6 with 25 percent of its farmers also considered small. This could lead to greater rural unemployment and aggravate poverty levels.
The elimination of the preferential trade agreement with Venezuela would also have a negative effect on rice millers through the loss of their most lucrative market. Rice millers would be less able to subsidize their participation in lower priced markets where the profit margins are smaller or nonexistent because of Guyana's high cost of rice production.
Rice millers, by paying lower prices to farmers, may improve their profit margins in these lower priced markets. However, millers' overall profit levels would fall below the levels previously enjoyed when the Venezuelan rice-for-oil pact was in place. This may compromise millers' financial position, especially those indebted to financial institutions. In the worst case, this could lead to bankruptcies and exits; however, the more likely scenario involves scaledback operations ---a reduction in mill production and a decrease in rice exports.
The last implication is that there would be a higher demand to store rice in order to avoid economic losses. Those with the means may attempt to store rice until new buyers can be found; however, storage capacity is considered limited. It is estimated that private sector stakeholders can store approximately 1 million bags of paddy rice for approximately three months without appreciable risk of deterioration in quality (Guyana Rice Development Board).
In previous years the carryover of unsold stock from one year to the next was high. In 2015, 200,000 metric tons were carried over from 2014 and this contributed to delays in paying farmers on time.
Conclusions and Recommendations
With the 2015 rice production projected to be approximately 683,516 metric tons, greater than the previous record setting crop of 2014 (635,238) , Guyana must take steps to ensure the continued viability of this industry. The country is facing a potential production glut and possible price retrenchment if the surplus above what is needed for domestic purposes and already contracted export sales cannot be placed in new export markets. Because production costs are still higher than the leading rice exporters (India, Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar, the United States, and Vietnam), a reduction in expected farm gate prices should be expected. Lower farm gate price expectations will in turn influence future planting decisions when new production cycles begin. Only the most productive, most cost efficient, and the least credit constrained farmers will have incentive to maintain and/or expand planted areas. In the coming years, the pressure to diversify and increase competitiveness will mount. Affected farmers are likely to lobby for price supports, more import duty concessions, and other input subsidies which if granted would increase costs to the public treasury and could put negative pressure on the fiscal balance.
Guyana has been pursuing three strategies (a) seeking new bilateral contracts (shortterm strategy); (b) investing in improving the productivity of the sector (medium-and long-term strategy); and (c) investing in the value added processing of rice so that new products can be marketed such as rice cereals, rice flour, rice wine, and rice vinegar (long term). Of the three strategies, action is visible on the first two points, but not the third. Rice millers and exporters have been pursuing new bilateral deals (for example, Belize, Mexico, Panama), attempting to sell more to CARICOM and the European Union. In addition, the Guyana Rice Development Board has been promoting the use of improved seeds and improved farming methods.
However, little action has taken place in terms of value-added manufacturing or introducing energy-saving technology/processes (for example, the use of biomass for gasification, solar, wind etc.).
Recommendations
Stakeholders need to redouble and intensify efforts to lower the cost of production. This is the key. Vietnam is entering the CARICOM market, it is already the premier supplier to Cuba, and poses a threat to Guyana even with the common external tariff which protects Guyanese producers and millers. This paper recommends conducting the following analyses with dispatch to help craft a national strategy and response to the emerging challenges in the rice sector:
1. Survey and catalogue rice producers to systematically understand cost drivers by farm size, by region, by quality of soil, by level of technology, and by state of irrigation system; next, develop detailed plans to trigger radical gains in cost reduction for the most promising farming segments and work to transition out the farmers that are woefully constrained and uncompetitive. This paper recommends performing energy audits and process reviews at the level of millers, to determine areas for cost reduction.
2. Actions may range from improved and better targeted extension services, technical assistance and basic infrastructure, to relief of credit constraints to permit adjustments and modernization, improvements in water management, farmer group organization and collective buying of inputs to reduce unit cost, and elimination of postharvest losses.
3. Establishment of stabilization and adjustment funds to cope with price volatility, weather risks, and adjustments for farmers whose production costs are high.. 4. Investing in value-added manufacturing should also be studied and comparative advantages determined.
5. Development of systematic marketing plans for the excess of production above annual domestic consumption needs.
APPENDIX
The Guyana-Venezuela Rice Trade agreement was signed on October 21, 2009. Under this agreement, Guyana effectively repays its oil debt owed to Venezuela under the PetroCaribe Initiative by exporting white rice and paddy to that country. The rice trade arrangement is considered to be a compensation arrangement, which in principle resembles a barter arrangement.
Under the PetroCaribe Initiative, the Guyana Energy Agency, on behalf of the local oil companies, purchases fuel from Venezuela's PDVSA (the state-owned oil company). Part of the purchases from PDVSA (on average 50 percent) is financed on long-term credit terms, which constitutes the PetroCaribe oil debt.
While Guyana only pays about half of its fuel bill with Venezuela on cash terms, the Guyana Energy Agency receives full payment for the fuel supplied to the local oil companies.
The portion of the fuel bill, which is financed under PetroCaribe, is held by the Government of Guyana as PetroCaribe savings. These savings are set aside to be used to finance the rice trade agreement and other priority projects.
Under the rice trade agreement, the Guyana Rice Development Board acts as the agent for farmers and millers in the export of rice and paddy to Venezuela's CASA (the agency within the Food Ministry responsible for imported food and agricultural products).
CASA is not required to make any cash payments on the rice and paddy shipped to Venezuela by the Guyana Rice Development Board. Instead, on a periodic basis, the value of the rice and paddy shipped is eventually offset against an equal value of the PetroCaribe oil debt through the signature of debt compensation agreements between the two governments.
The exporters of rice and paddy are paid in cash by the Guyana Rice Development Board through the use of the PetroCaribe savings.
The prices and volumes of rice and paddy that are to be exported by Guyana under the rice trade agreement are fixed through annual sales contracts that are negotiated and signed between the Guyana Rice Development Board and CASA. These contracts intrinsically take into the consideration the expected value of the financed portion of the fuel bill under PetroCaribe, to avoid rice and paddy shipments above the value that could be financed from the PetroCaribe savings. In essence, rice and paddy trade under the Rice Trade Agreement is constrained by the expected value of fuel trade and savings under PetroCaribe. In recent years, the approximate amount has a range of US$130-US$167 million.
Rice and paddy prices fixed with CASA are on CIF terms, with the Guyana Rice Development Board being responsible for paying for the cost of the products plus insurance, freight and other charges which includes quality assurance, fumigation, and demurrage. The freight costs and associated charges related to the supply of rice and paddy is estimated to be about US$80 and US$56 per metric ton, respectively. In early 2014, some local shippers indicated the ability to ship paddy at considerably lower costs, as low as US$36 per metric ton (Kaieteur News, 2014) . While the lower shipping costs quoted did not seem to include associated charges, such as fumigation, quality control, and so forth, it appears as though the shippers contracted by the Guyana Rice Development Board are earning premium prices for the services rendered under the rice trade arrangement with Venezuela. 
